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INSURANCE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
A REEVALUATION
Whether an insurance company can legally write a policy covering
a client's liability for punitive damages is a question curiously unsettled
in this country. Thus far the jurisdictions which have considered the
issue have split exactly evenly. Nine have found such coverage to be
available; 1 an equal number reject any coverage of a punitive damage
award, 2 arguing that such coverage would completely eviscerate the
punitive effect of the award.3 The latter is the position clearly favored
by the commentators4 and seems to be the better holding in view of
public policy.5 However, since most of the cases since 1970 advocate
1. See Price v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972);
Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United States F.I. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783
(1973); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); Wolff v.
General Cas. Co., 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112,
120 A. 435 (1923); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965);
Lazenby v. Universal Und. Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Dairyland
County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972). See also
Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d 760 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1965).
2. See Brown v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App.
1971) (not selected for official publication); Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins.
Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523
(10th Cir. 1966); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973); Crull v.
Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins.
Co., 82 NJ. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59
Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.2d 375 (1969); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d
793 (1966). See also Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357
(1941).
3. See notes 51-55 & accompanying text infra.
4. See, e.g., Hall, The Validity of Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages-An
Unresolved Question?, 4 N. MEx. L. Rav. 65 (1973); Kendrigan, Public Policy's
Prohibition Against Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 36 INs. CoUNSEL J. 622
(1969); Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile Cases, 456 INs. LJ. 27 (1961);
Comment, Public Policy Prohibits Insurance Indemnification Against Awards of Punitive
Damages, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 944 (1963); Comment, Insurer's Liability for Punitive
Damages, 14 Mo. L. REv. 175 (1949); Comment, Insurance Coverage and the Punitive
Damage Award in the Automobile Accident Case, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 144 (1957);
Comment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in Automobile Accident
Litigation, 46 VA. L. RFv. 1036 (1960). But see Lambert, Does Liability Insurance
Cover Punitive Damages? 517 INs. L.J 75 (1966); Lentz, Payment of Punitive Damages
by Insurance Companies, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. RaV. 313 (1966); Note, Automobile
Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 20 S.C.L. Rav. 71 (1968).
5. See notes 51-55 & accompanying text infra.
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coverage,6 the current trend appears to favor an inclusive liability on
the part of the insurer. This note will first discuss the current status
of the issue in jurisdictions other than California. The analysis will
then shift to the question of whether such insurance is or should be
allowed under California law.
Background: The Doctrine of Punitive Damages
Punitive or exemplary damages are a class of money damages
awarded in tort actions, usually beyond what is needed to compensate
the plaintiff for the harm done by the defendant. The doctrine has been
criticized repeatedly.7 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire said:
"The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and
unhealthy excrescense, deforming the symmetry and body of the law." 8
Despite such criticism, punitive damages are recognized in all but four
states. Only Louisiana,9 Massachusetts,' 0 Nebraska,'1 and Washing-
ton 2 have rejected the doctrine.' 3
The concept of punitive damages originally developed in the days
when damages awarded in tort cases at common law were restricted
to pecuniary loss and did not include such elements as mental suffering.
In an early Texas case, Stuart v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,' 4 dam-
ages for mental anguish were sought against a telegraph company for
failure to deliver a death message. In holding that the injury was com-
pensable, the court stated that a consistent failure to recognize that such
injuries should enter into a proper assessment of damages had caused
the courts to create a new source of damages for these injuries-the
doctrine of punitive damages. When, during the 19th century, the con-
6. See notes 67-79 & accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 27-28, 31 & accompanying text infra.
8. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 343, 382, 16 Am. R. 270, 320 (1873).
9. See, e.g., McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932).
10. See, e.g., Boott Mills v. Boston & M.R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680
(1914).
11. See, e.g., Winkler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 8 Am. St. R. 155 (1888).
12. See, e.g., Walker v. Gilman, 25 Wash. 2d 557, 171 P.2d 797 (1946). A more
recent case holds that such damages are unsound in principle, but may be awarded when
specifically authorized by statute. See Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 246 P.2d
853 (1952).
13. England has also abolished punitive damages except where they could serve a
"useful purpose," by penalizing oppressive and arbitrary action by government servants,
tortious conduct calculated to make a profit for the actor and the like. See Rookes v.
Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129.
14. 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1855).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
November 1976] INSURANCE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
cept of damages was broadened to include mental suffering,' 5 the result
was a shift in the underlying theory of punitive damages from compen-
sation to punishment and deterrence. The vast majority of states now
impose punitive damages with the intent of punishing the wrongdoer,16
since compensatory damages now cover nonphysical injuries. How-
ever, in some states it is still held that punitive damages are awarded
not as a punishment for the defendant, but as compensation to the
plaintiff, although they may, and of course do, operate as a sanction.
For instance, in Connecticut, "exemplary" damages may not exceed the
amount of plaintiffs expenses of litigation, less taxable costs, and hence
in effect are compensatory.1 7 In Michigan,"8 New Hampshire,' 9 and
Iowa, 20 punitive damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for
the mental injury caused him, as distinguished from damages for actual
material loss. In other jurisdictions, exemplary damages are expressly
defined as encompassing both a punitive and a compensatory nature.2'
Various theories have been advanced to justify the doctrine of
punitive damages. For instance, they are defended as a method of
combining public law enforcement with private vengence, and thus dis-
couraging self help.22 Under this "private attorney general theory,123
the argument is that since the victim will benefit at the expense of the
wrongdoer, society is able to deter undesirable conduct that for one
reason or another it chooses not to punish by criminal sanctions. 24
Punitive damages are also justified as a way to make the admoni-
tory function of tort actions more effective than would be the case if
the money damages were limited to compensation. For example, in
15. See Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889), T. SEDIWlCK, MEASURE OF
DAMAGES 648 n.2 (5th ed. 1869).
16. 22 AM. Jum. 2D Damages § 236.
17. See Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
18. See, e.g., Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922).
19. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 343, 382, 16 Am. R. 270, 320 (1873).
20. See, e.g., Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa 329, 177 N.W. 65 (1920).
21. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912);
Beck v. Dowell, 111 Mo. 506, 20 S.W. 209 (1892); Samuels v. Richmond & D.R.R., 35
S.C. 493, 14 S.E. 943 (1892); Hicks v. Herring, 144 S.E.2d 151 (S.C. 1965); Pan Am
Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).
22. See Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798
(1933).
23. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 170 N.E.2d 497 (1961); D. DoBBs,
REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973).
24. See Neal v. Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 123 So. 861 (1929). See also
Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United States F.I. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783
(1973) (concurring opinion) (encouraging the plaintiff to bring suit is a recognized
corollary purpose of punitive damages).
Funk v. Kerbaugh,25 the defendant, engaged in constructing a railroad,
caused severe damage to the plaintiff's home by reckless blasting. The
defendant stated that he knew injury would result but that he preferred
to continue his wilful conduct, as it was cheaper to pay the resultant
damages than to do the work in a way which would avoid the harm.
In such a case it is evident that if the defendant were required only
to make the plaintiff whole, he would not be dissuaded from future
tortious conduct.
Assuming arguendo that punitive damages may have some value as
a deterrent, there is some question whether the award should go to the
already compensated sufferer rather than to the public on whose behalf
he is punished. 26  Reserving the award for the benefit of society might
permit the jury to take a more objective view of the conduct and assess
an amount sufficient to achieve punishment and deterrence without
unduly enlarging the award from misguided sympathy for the plaintiff,
who in theory at least has been fully compensated for his losses.
Some of the strongest doubts about punitive damages concern
their very nature as a punishment. As such, they are criticized as con-
trary to the purposes of civil law, which is intended to be compensatory,
as distinct from criminal law, in which punishment is a traditional func-
tion.2" As a punishment, punitive damages have been criticized as
a potential source of double jeopardy.2 8 Indiana, at least, has been
persuaded by this argument and refuses to award punitive damages
25. 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908).
26. See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891);
Bass v. The Chicago & N.R.R., 42 Wis. 654 (1877). The Nebraska Supreme Court
has suggested that an award of punitive damages is a windfall and amounts to an illegal
confiscation of the defendant's property for the benefit of the plaintiff. Riewe v.
McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881). See also DEFENSE RESEARCH INsTrrTrTE,
THE CASE AGAINST PuNT DAMAGES 28 (D. Hirsch & J. Povros eds. 1969) (mono-
graph) [hereinafter cited as THE CASE AGAINST PUNTIVE DAMAGES]. This was a
proposal of model legislation providing for the payment of any punitive damage recovery
into the state treasury for the credit of the school fund.
27. See Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, in
THE CASE AGAINST PuNnrIvE DAMAGES, supra note 26, at 4.
28. See Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1158 (1966). As early as 1851, the doctrine of
punitive damages was challenged unsuccessfully as unconstitutional. See Day v. Wood-
worth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 370-71 (1851). Since such damages serve a purpose so
similar to that of the criminal law, it has been argued that the defendant should be
granted the procedural due process guarantees afforded one accused of criminal conduct.
See Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, THE CASE AGAINST PUNrIvE
DAMAGES, supra note 26, at 15 (1969). This, of course, would change the whole nature
of civil proceedings.
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where the defendant is subject to criminal sanctions.29 Other courts
hold that where a defendant has been punished criminally, such punish-
ment must be considered as a mitigating factor in awarding punitive
damages.30
It has been further suggested that punitive awards reflect a dis-
satisfaction with the present doctrine of compensatory damages, and
that, were they eliminated, the jury would increase the amount awarded
for pain and suffering to grant the same total damages."- Assuming
this to be true, as a defense of punitive damages it is nonetheless
unsound. If the compensatory damage doctrine is inadequate, the
proper solution is to liberalize it, and not to force punitive damages into
serving a function other than that for which it was intended.
Despite the criticism levied against punitive damages by both
courts and commentators, the doctrine has persisted. In the implemen-
tation of the law of punitive damages as applied to an insured defend-
ant, a question arises regarding the propriety of permitting insurance
against such damages. In determining whether an insured defendant
can look to his insurance carrier for protection from the imposition of
punitive damages, the controversy focuses on whether such damages
are covered by an ordinary policy, and if so, whether this kind of insur-
ance might defeat the whole purpose of punitive damages.
29. See Skufakiss v. Duray, 154 N.E. 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1926).
30. See, e.g., Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911); Jackson v.
Wells, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 35 S.W. 528 (1896). In West Virginia, the jury is
expressly reminded to consider the punitive effect of compensatory damages before
assessing an additional punitive award: "If, after the jury has assessed damages to fully
compensate the plaintiff for the injury, such damages are still not sufficient in amount to
punish the defendant ... and ... to prevent the repetition of the same or the
commission of similar wrongs, they may add such further sum, in their judgment, as may
be necessary for this purpose. But if the damages assessed as compensation are
sufficient in amount to operate at the same time as a punishment and a warning, the jury
are not authorized to add still a further and greater sum, and thus subject the defendant
to a double punishment in the same case for the same wrong." Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W.
Va. 246, 260, 22 S.E. 58, 63 (1895). See also Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 94 S.E.
968 (1918).
31. See Comment, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HIv. L. Rv. 517
(1957); Comment, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 10 IDsiso L. Rnv. 263
(1974). Further discussion is beyond the scope of this article; for a deeper analysis of
punitive damages, see Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement
for the Affirmative, 1965 ABA SEcr. INs. NEGL. & Comp. L. 282; Corboy, Should
Punitive Damages Be Abolished?-A Statement for the Negative, 1965 ABA SEcr. INS.
NEGL. & CoM. LAW 282; Willis, Measure of Damages When Property is Wrongfully
Taken by a Private Individual, 22 HAv. L. Rnv. 419 (1909); Tum CAsE AGA NsrT
Pumtrv DAMAGES, supra note 26, at 28; Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HIv. L. Rnv. 517 (1957); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil
Courts: 4 Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 1158 (1966).
One Line of Analysis: Are Punitive Damages Covered
by the Insurance Contract?
In determining whether insurance against punitive damages is
available, the courts in some cases have chosen to focus on the contrac-
tual language and have merely asked whether such damages are within
the coverage of the policy, never reaching the difficult social questions
involved. In other cases, by contrast, the courts have based their deci-
sions on public policy, regardless of whether punitive damages could
be fitted within the terms of the insurance policy.
As a matter of contractual interpretation, most courts which have
used this analysis agree that the terms of the policy embrace liability
for punitive damages.32 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Janich33 is typical of the early cases which often addressed only the
issue of coverage. In that case, the policy obligated the insurer to "pay
on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obli-
gated to pay by reason of liability imposed by law." 4 The court simply
stated that such a broad provision would be construed to cover punitive
damages. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance Co.35 like-
wise held that "since this [insurance] policy clearly covers bodily
damage through negligence, and since these punitive damages are
imposed because of the aggravated circumstances or form of this negli-
gence, such punitive damages must be regarded as coming within the
meaning of the policy." 6 The South Carolina court, in the recent case
of Carroway v. Johnson, 7 faced a more typical insurance policy requir-
ing the insurer to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of . . .bodily injury . . . .",3 The court simply decided that since
32. See General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956);
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934); Concord Gen.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v.
United States F.I. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Carroway v. Johnson, 245
S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477
S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972). For cases contra, see notes 48-49 & accompanying
text infra.
33. 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
34. Id. at 19.
35. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934) (applying Missouri law), cert. denied, 295 U.S.
734 (1935).
36. Id. at 59.
37. 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965), noted in 25 MD. L. Rav. 326 (1965).
38. 245 S.C. 200, 202, 139 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1965). In this case, the defendant
insurance company relied on an earlier South Carolina case in which the court had held
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the punitive damage award was obviously one which the insured was
legally obligated to pay, and since such award further arose from the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff, it was within the policy provisions.39
Such an argument turns on the established rules of interpretation of ad-
hesion contracts, which require a strict construction in favor of the
insured.40 In none of these cases, however, did a court expressly con-
sider the public policy issue.
In failing to discuss the public policy issue, courts may simply be
implying that the social policy favoring enforcement of contracts out-
weighs the policy of deterrence which underlies punitive damages. In
the leading case allowing recovery from an insurance company,
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.,41 the court stated
this argument as follows:
The insurance contract in the case at bar is a private contract
between defendant and their assured. . which when construed
as written would be held to protect him against claims for both
compensatory and punitive damages. Then to hold assured, as a
matter of public policy, is not protected by the policy on a claim
for punitive damages would have the effect to partially void the
contract. 4a
Courts favoring the sanctity of contract over the punishment of the
wrongdoer have alternatively found coverage by emphasizing the ex-
that insurance issued under the uninsured motorist statutes did not provide for the
payment of punitive damages to a person injured in a collision with an uninsured
motorist. The court in that case specifically declined to decide whether such insurance
for punitive damages would violate public policy.
39. See Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 205, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1965),
stating: "The policy under consideration did not limit recovery to actual or compensato-
ry damages. The language of the policy here is sufficiently broad enough to cover
liability for punitive damages as such damages are included in the 'sums' which the
insured is legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury within the
meaning of the policy." Id. For additional cases following the theory that punitive
damages are within the policy terms, see note 32 supra.
40. See notes 44-45 infra.
41. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
42. Id. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5. See also Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala.
260, 263, 189 So. 897, 899 (1939) (insurer's liability to pay punitive damages arises out
of its obligation to pay judgment rendered against insured). The Arizona Supreme
Court has declared: "Mhe state of Arizona has more than one public policy ... One
such public policy is that an insurance company which admittedly took a premium for
covering all liability for damages, should honor its obligation." Price v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524 (1972). Cf. Wolff v. General Cas.
Co. of America, 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961). In Wolff the court agreed that
public policy precludes persons from purchasing pacts indemnifying them against the
consequences of their wilful acts. However, the court declined to use this policy as the
basis for an implied exclusion of wilful conduct in the absence of evidence that the
parties intended such an exclusion. Id.
pectation interest of the insured.48  These courts have supported such
a conclusion by citing the established rules that (1) where the language
is unclear, the policy must be construed most strongly against the
insurer as drafter,4 4 and (2) the meaning of any term must be tested
ultimately by the expectation of the insured. 45  However, if the tort-
feasor expects that the penalty for his action will be covered by his
insurance, all deterrent effect of punitive damages is, of course,
negated.46  This expectation argument, for example, was summarily
disposed of by the Florida court: "We believe that a person has no
right to expect the law to allow him to place responsibility for his reck-
less and wanton acts on someone else."
'4 7
The process of construction, of course, has not invariably led to
a conclusion that coverage exists. For example, several courts have
construed similarly worded insurance policies in a way that precluded
recovery for punitive damages. The Colorado court, following the
majority view as to the nature of exemplary damages, has held that the
punitive award was primarily intended to punish the wrongdoer rather
than to compensate the aggrieved party for bodily injury, and thus was
outside the terms of the policy, which limited coverage to compensatory
damages imposed for such injury.4 More recently, the Missouri court
stated:
There is no language in the policy that provides for the payment
of judgments for punitive damages. The policy covers only
43. See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383
S.W.2d 1 (1964). See also 7 J. APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 4312, at
132 (1942). The author expresses the opinion that "if it is clear that the average insured
contemplates protection against claims of any character caused by his operation of an
automobile, not intentionally inflcted .... " In his 1972 supplement the author
continues: "In any event a court should not aid an insurer which fails to exclude
liability for punitive damages. Surely there is nothing in the insuring clause that would
forewarn an insured that such was to be the intent of the parties."
44. 43 AM. JuR. 2D Insurance § 271.
45. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168
(1966); Note, Insurance Contracts and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 THE
FORUM 116 (1971).
46. This argument can be consistently applied only in that minority of states
which follows a theory of punitive damages as compensatory in nature, for if compensa-
tion is the objective, the expectation of the insured is immaterial. See text accompany-
ing notes 17-21 supra. The Arizona court, rejecting this contention, held that insurance
did not mean the driver could engage in wanton acts with impunity, since he would be
subject to criminal penalties and soaring premiums. Price v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972). See notes 73-75 & accompanying text infra.
47. Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App.
1965).
48. Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
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damages for bodily injury and property damage sustained by any
person. Punitive damages do not fall in this category. The $2000
award of punitive damages to plaintiff was to punish defendant for
his wrongful acts and as a warning to others. It was not to com-
pensate the plaintiff for bodily injury and property damage. 49
Thus, analysis based primarily on determining the proper con-
struction of a particular insurance policy has led to different results
in different jurisdictions. Though such analysis may be plausible, it is
nonetheless incomplete; it leaves the determination of public policy
questions involved to mere implication.
Other courts, however, have determined the construction issue to
be immaterial,5" and have addressed instead the public policy issue
directly.
A Second Line of Analysis: Coverage of Punitive
Damages Is Contrary to Public Policy
The earliest case referring to public policy is the Colorado case
of Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tenery.51 The court did not
specifically address the public policy question, but said that because
punitive damages were awarded as a punishment, and because the
insurance company did not agree to indemnify for more than bodily
injuries, "[tihe injured party will not be allowed to collect from a non-
participating party for a wrong against the public.
'52
The leading case prohibiting coverage for punitive damages by
insurance companies under a public policy theory is Northwestern
National Casualty Co. v. McNulty.58  Defendant, insured under a policy
issued in Virginia, lost control of his car while intoxicated. The plain-
tiff suffered severe injuries, and brought suit for compensatory and
punitive damages in Florida, where the accident occurred. The plain-
49. Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). See also Caspersen v.
Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973).
50. See American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966); Northwest-
ern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Nicholson v. American
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
51. 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
52. Id. at 17, 39 P.2d at 779. The case involved the liability of an insurance
company on a policy issued to the Hertz system to cover drivers of their rented cars. The
case could thus be distinguished, and Hertz could have been indemnified on the ground
that liability was not personal, but the court did not base its decision on this. Further-
more, the Colorado court has recently affirmed the holding in two cases involving
personal liability. See Brown v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1971) (not selected for official publication); Gleason v. Fryer, 30 Colo. App. 106,
491 P.2d 85 (1971).
53. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); see 36 U. CoLo. L. REv. 287 (1964).
tiff was awarded a total of $57,000, including $20,000 punitive
damages. Plaintiff and defendant driver brought a garnishment action
to recover up to the policy limit of $50,000, and from a summary judg-
ment in their favor the insurance company appealed, protesting the
liability for punitive damages. Judge Wisdom's opinion hinged on the
public policy behind punitive damages in Florida and Virginia. He
pointed out that since exemplary damages are awarded as a deterrent,
allowing the insured to shift the burden to the insurance company
would negate the purpose of the sanction:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he
gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment
of sanctions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insur-
ance against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative
of public policy. The same public policy should invalidate any
contract of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive
damages represent.
The policy considerations in a state where, as in Florida and
Virginia, punitive damages are awarded for punishment and deter-
rence, would seem to require that the damages rest ultimately as
well as nominally on the party actually responsible for the wrong.
If that person were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance
company, punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. Such
damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since com-
pensatory damages already have made the plaintiff whole. And
there is no point in punishing the insurance company; it has done
no wrong. In actual fact, of course, and considering the extent to
which the public is insured, the burden would ultimately come to
rest not on the insurance companies but on the public, since the
added liability to the insurance companies would be passed along
to the premium payers. Society would then be punishing itself for
the wrong committed by the insured.
5 4
Most of the legal commentators on this subject supported this
conclusion even before McNulty 55 The logic of the argument seems
undeniable; if punitive damages are intended to punish a wrongdoer,
allowing insurance coverage frustrates the essential effect of the award
by permitting the tortfeasor to escape the sting of the sanction.
Argument: Public Policy Does Not Prohibit Coverage of Punitive
Damages
Two years after McNulty, the Supreme Court of Tennessee was
faced with a similar case. In Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters
Insurance Co.,56 the plaintiff sustained personal injuries resulting from
54. 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962).
55. See note 4 supra.
56. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); see Long, Insurance Protection Against
Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. REv. 573 (1965).
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the negligence of the intoxicated defendant driver, and was awarded
punitive as well as compensatory damages. The defendant driver's
insurance company agreed to pay the compensatory damages but
denied liability for the punitive damages, claiming that they were not
covered by the contract. The court, although acknowledging that
exemplary damages in Tennessee are awarded as a punishment and
deterrent, rejected the insurance company's argument and found the
insurer liable for all damages awarded. Perhaps most important, the
court rejected the public policy argument:
Public policy is practically synonymous with public good and unless
the private contract is in terms of such a character as to tend to
harm or injure the public good, public interest [or] public welfare
or to violate the Constitution, laws. or judicial decisions of the
State, it is not violative of public policy nor void on that account.57
Although coverage of a punitive award by insurance is a result
espoused by at least nine jurisdictions, most do not state their rejection
of the public policy argument as definitively as did the Tennessee court.
The public policy argument rests heavily on the concept of such
damages as a punishment and deterrent, and thus is inherently sus-
ceptible of two rebuttals; either (1) that the deterrent effect of punitive
damages is nil, or (2) that punitive damages are "compensatory" in
some sense and thus coverage is not inconsistent with public policy.
Lazenby, the leading case advocating coverage, provides an
example of the first type of argument. There the court stated:
We . . . are not able to agree [that] the closing of the insurance
market, on the payment of punitive damages, to [socially irrespon-
sible] drivers would necessarily accomplish the result of deterring
them in their wrongful conduct. This State, in regard to the proper
operation of motor vehicles, has a great many detailed criminal
sanctions, which apparently have not deterred this slaughter on our
highways and streets. Then to say the closing of the insurance
market, in the payment of punitive damages, would act to deter
guilty drivers would in our opinion contain some element of
speculation.58
57. 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964).
58. Id. See also Price v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d
522 (1972) (suggesting if insurance is allowed, deterrence is effected by the possibility
that award will exceed policy coverage). If the deterrent effect is questioned, a more
effective argument can be advanced. The action of the insured must be unintentional to
be within the policy at all; where punitive damages are thus awarded for gross negligence
or recklessness, rather than an intentional tort, and thus where there is no mens rea, any
punishment might have little effect. For a different view, see Lambert, Does Liability
Insurance Cover Punitive Damages? 517 INs. LJ. 75, 81 (1966). The author argues
that "insurance companies today take great interest and pride in promoting safer driving.
Their interest may diminish and fade if they cease to be liable for punitive damages.
This argument can be countered, however. As the court stated
in American Surety Co. of New York v. Gold:59
[W]e may as well say criminal sanctions serve no useful purpose
just because they are constantly violated. The question is not so
much the efficacy of the policy underlying punitive damages; rather
it is a question of the implementation of that policy. Permitting
the penalty for the misdeed to be levied on one other than he who
committed it cannot possibly implement the policy.60
The second argument that public policy does not preclude
coverage is that in some states, at least, the purpose of punitive dam-
ages is not only punishment but also enlarged compensation. 61 The
Connecticut case of Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co.6 2 is often cited
in this regard. Here, after compensatory damages had been assessed,
an additional amount was imposed on the defendant as a penalty under
the state's treble damage statute. The court found the carrier not liable
for the penalty, but held that a claim for other kinds of punitive
damages might be covered under the policy in question. The decision
hinged on the nature of the punishment inflicted. In Connecticut,
punitive damages are compensatory, as they "are limited to the costs
of litigation less taxable costs. . ,,63 But because the particular stat-
ute involved in Tedesco was penal in nature, insurance coverage was
precluded:
A policy which permitted an insured to recover from the insurer
fines imposed for a violation of a criminal law would certainly be
against public policy. The same would be true of a policy which
expressly covered an obligation of the insured to pay a sum of
money in no way representing injuries or losses suffered by the
plaintiff but imposed as a penalty because of a public wrong ...
In this case, the additional sum representing the doubling of the
compensatory damages is, in its essence, a liability imposed, not for
damages because of bodily injury, but as a reward for securing the
punishment of one who has committed a wrong of a public
nature.6
Thus, this case supports coverage for punitive damages, but only
where they are compensatory. Absent the compensatory nature of
punitive damages, the court would have held against coverage. 65
Why deprive the automobile liability carriers of any incentive to promote ever safer
driving?" Id.
59. 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
60. Id. at 527.
61. See notes 17-21 & accompanying text supra.
62. 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941). See also 40 MICH. L. Ray. 128 (1941).
63. Chykirda v. Yanush, 131 Conn. 565, 568, 41 A.2d 449, 450 (1945).
64. 127 Conn. at 537, 18 A.2d at 359.
65. Similarly, two cases arising in Alabama are often mistakenly cited in support
of the position that an insurance company can be held liable for punitive damages. Both
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Tedesco, then, is not in conflict with McNulty, for in the latter case
the court limited its proscription to those "damages awarded with a view
to punish the defendant for irresponsible conduct and to deter the
defendant and others from similar misconduct."
6
In any event, neither the argument that punitive damages have
no deterrent value nor the argument that punitive damages are com-
pensatory effectively refutes the public policy argument against cover-
age as explicated in McNulty. The fact remains that by passing the
ultimate liability for punitive damages along to an insurance company,
the tortfeasor is relieved of any penalty for his act. This, of course,
defeats the whole purpose behind punitive damages and accordingly is
an unacceptable result in jurisdictions where such damages are thought
to further an important public policy.
Insurance for Punitive Damages: The Trend in Recent Cases
McNulty and Lazenby thus represent the two polar positions on
the issue of insurance for punitive damages. Currently the states which
have decided the issue are equally divided;6r but of the seven cases
since 1970, four have allowed coverage on various theories. As the
three noncoverage cases represent only two jurisdictions, this may
cases involved the Alabama wrongful death statute, and both held the insurer liable. See
Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); American Fid. & Cas.
Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935). However, under Alabama law, all
damages awarded in an action for wrongful death are deemed punitive. In the Werfel
case, the court said, "The policy, being broad enough to cover personal injury or death as
the result of an accident occurring while the policy was in force, was therefore broad
enough to cover liability for death, and recovery under the homicide statute for wrongful
death. This recovery would have been for punitive damages purely. It may not be
successfully contended that the policy did not protect against punitive damages for bodily
injuries so inflicted." 230 Ala. 552, 556, 162 So. 103, 106 (1935) (citations omitted).
Thus, to provide any compensation at all to a plaintiff in such an action, insurance must
be permitted, but as the intent of the award is not primarily punitive, no public policy is
violated by allowing insurance.
One writer has suggested that Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So.
671 (1937), has extended this policy of coverage for punitive damages to an action
arising under the state's automobile guest statute, which does not contain the same quirk
of compensation. See 63 CoLum. L. RFv. 944, 947 (1963). -In Brock, the court said,
"At the trial the simple negligence count was submitted and the jury duly instructed in
the oral charge as to such issue and damages. The damages recovered were within the
terms of the policy construed in the Werfel Case. . . ." 233 Ala. at 553, 172 So. at 673.
If the insurer was held liable for the punitive damages awarded in this case, it was on a
count of simple negligence, which is contrary to the weight of authority. See 15 AM.
JuR. Damages § 274 (1938).
66. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962).
67. See notes 1-2 supra.
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presage a trend toward following the Lazenby decision and upholding
coverage for punitive damages.
For example, the district court for Maine in the case of Concord
General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hills68 gave a judgment for the
insured based on a contract interpretation argument, stating merely that
"it is well settled that such broad provisions in automobile liability poli-
cies unmistakably include both compensatory and punitive damages."69
While this may be true, it hardly establishes the propriety of such cover-
age, an issue the court does not discuss.
A recent Idaho case, Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v.
United States Fire Insurance Co.,70 also allowed coverage. There the
Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged the construction argument and
agreed that insurance policies must be construed liberally, and then,
after extensive quotes from McNulty and Lazenby, accepted the latter
decision without independent reasoning.
The Texas court in Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wallgren7 1 also allowed coverage, after considering the construction
issue and an interesting variation on the public policy argument. The
court concluded:
[T]erms and conditions set out in the insurance contract before
us-having been prescribed and approved by the Insurance Com-
mission-accord with and represent the public policy of the state.
Stated another way: the terms and conditions of the policy do not
contravene public policy.
72
Finally, the Arizona case of Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem-
nity Co. 73 also made a different kind of public policy argument, holding
that "the state of Arizona has more than one public policy. . . . One
such public policy is that an insurance company, which admittedly took
a premium for covering all liability for damages, should honor its obli-
gation. ' 74  The Arizona court bolstered its decision with five other
assertions, including an enumeration of other penalties to which the
68. 345 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972).
69. Id. at 1095. The court cited United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3
F.R.D. 16, 19 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
70. 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); see Note, Insurance Coverage of Punitive
Damages, 10 IDAHo L. REv. 263 (1974).
71. 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); see Note, Exemplary Damages-An
Insurable Risk for Texas Drivers, 10 HousT. L. REv. 192 (1972).
72. 477 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
73. 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
74. Id. at 487, 502 P.2d at 524. It may be questioned, however, whether rates are
in fact set for total coverage, that is, whether the premiums are assessed in an amount
sufficient to cover punitive awards.
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insured is exposed, and a rejection of McNulty's argument that allowing
insurance would result in an additional burden on the driving public.75
Thus, it is clear that none of the recent pro-coverage cases really refute
the essential public policy argument of deterrence as stated in McNulty;
however, the three recent cases which reject coverage likewise fail to
discuss expressly the public policy issue.
In Caspersen v. Webber,78 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held
that the punitive damages were awarded to the plaintiff as a punish-
ment and deterrent, and not as compensation for bodily injury, and thus
the company's policy, which required it to pay "al sums the insured shall
be legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury'
'77
afforded no coverage for punitive damages. In Colorado, the court of
appeals also used a construction argument and held in two cases 78 that
Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tenery79 was controlling; that is,
that punitive damages are not compensatory and are not covered by an
insurance policy even though not specifically excluded. These three
cases, while reaching the same result as McNulty, are phrased in terms
of canons of construction, not considerations of public policy, although
the Minnesota court did cite McNulty to support its decision.
Thus, it can be seen that jurisdictions across the country currently
are equally divided on the question of the liability of an insurer for a
punitive damage award. Although the recent cases show a slight
numerical majority in favor of coverage, and thus may represent some-
thing of a trend, the evidence is at best inconclusive.
75. Id. The court continued: "First, even though a driver is insured for punitive
damages he cannot engage in wanton conduct with impunity. In the instant case, drag
racing would subject him to criminal penalties. His insurance rates would soar....
Second, Hartford has voluntarily covered its insured's liability for punitive damages, and
since its premiums were based on its exposure, it may be presumed that holding it liable
for what it has promised to pay would not result in additional burdens on the driving
public. Third, the criminal penalties include possible loss of the driver's license and
compulsory attendance at the traffic school. Fourth, punitive damages are not only
designed to punish the offender but are also designed to serve as a deterrent to others.
Since it is common knowledge that the vast majority of drivers do not carry million
dollar liability policies, the possibility that punitive damages will exceed their policy
limits will exercise a deterrent effect on them. Fifth, there is no evidence that those
states which deny coverage have accomplished any appreciable effect on the slaughter on
their highways." Id.
76. 298 Minn. 93, 213 N W.2d 327 (1973).
77. Id. at99,213 N.W.2d at 331.
78. Brown v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971)
(not selected for official publication); Gleason v. Fryer, 30 Colo. App. 106, 491 P.2d 85
(1971).
79. 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934). See notes 48, 51-52 & accompanying text
supra.
California has never squarely faced the issue.80 The case of
United Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Janich,1 which involved a partner-
ship as the insured party, was a federal diversity action decided in 1943,
and has been cited as indicating that coverage for punitive damages is
available.82  However, given the statutorily defined purpose and the
public policy underlying the imposition of such damages in California
case law,8 an argument will be made in this note that, Janich notwith-
standing, California courts would adopt a policy against coverage.
The holding in Janich is not without merit when confined to its
facts, that is, a situation in which the injured party is vicariously liable
for the acts of an employee. Vicarious liability for punitive damages,
as will be seen, raises an entirely different sort of question. Three
states have faced the issue of coverage only in this context, and have
found for coverage.8 4  Of those states which have determined that
insurance does not cover a punitive damage award, five have estab-
lished an exception for vicarious liability. 5 When the impact of the
award falls on one liable only under respondeat superior, no public
policy is violated by allowing insurance. As a result, California should,
consistent with its statutes and prevailing case law, adopt a policy of
noncoverage generally, but should allow insurance to cover an award
of punitive damages when the insured is only vicariously liable.
California's Position on Punitive Damages
The Status of California Statutes and Their Construction
In California, a discussion of whether insurance is available for
punitive damages must begin by examining the pertinent statutes.
Civil Code section 3294 provides:
80. But see 59 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 204 (1976) (insurance for school board mem-
bers).
81. 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
82. Annot. 20 A.L.R.3d 343; Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp.
1090 (D. Me. 1972). See note 68 infra.
83. See notes 90-132 & accompanying text infra.
84. See Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d
582 (1969); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943);
Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969).
85. See Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934);
Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Wilson, 261 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507
S.W.2d 146 (1973); Malanga v. Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958);
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934) (applying
Missouri law), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935). See Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super.
200, 224 A.2d 793 (1967) (dicta).
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In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from con-
tract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual
damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by
way of punishing the defendant.86
Under this section, punitive damages in California are imposed strictly
as a punishment.87 There are no compensatory aspects involved.
88
In applying this statute, some California courts have held that the
malice required therein can be found only in cases involving a wilful
or intentional act. In Gombos v. Ashe, 9 for example, the court of
appeal declared:
In order to warrant the allowance of [punitive] damages the act
complained of must not only be wilful, in the sense of intentional,
but it must be accompanied by some aggravating circumstance,
amounting to maice.... Mere negligence, even gross negligence,
is not sufficient to justify such an award.90
Apparently, punitive damages would be imposed on a wrongdoer
only in cases of intentional torts. In such circumstances, it is clear that
insurance coverage is not ordinarily available even for compensatory
damages: California statutes prohibit any coverage of a wilful act, as
it is considered contrary to public policy to indemnify one from the con-
sequences of his intentional torts. Thus, section 533 of the Insurance
Code provides:
An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the
insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured,
or of the insured's agents or others.91
This statute, which precludes coverage of liability resulting from a wil-
ful act, and section 3294 of the Civil Code, which requires malice as
a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages, appear to render moot
any question of an insurer's liability for punitive awards, given that Cali-
fornia case law indicates that the term "malice" implies "wilful act."92
86. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West 1970). See also Fitzpatrick v. Clark, 26 Cal.
App. 2d 710, 713, 80 P.2d 183, 184 (1938). "The right to recover punitive damages
arises solely by virtue of section 3294 of the Civil Code .... " Id.
87. See Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Gudarov v.
Hadjieff, 38 Cal. 2d 412, 240 P.2d 621 (1952); Hall v. Berkell, 130 Cal. App. 2d 800,
279 P.2d 832 (1955).
88. See Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948).
89. 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958).
90. Id. at 526, 322 P.2d at 939; see 23 CAL. JuR. 3D Damages § 123 (1975).
91. CAL. INs. CODb § 533 (West 1972).
92. In California, under the statutes, negligence alone will not support a punitive
damage award. See Spencer v. San Francisco Brick Co., 5 Cal. App. 126, 89 P. 851
(1907); Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cal. 297 (1857); Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for
the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20 HAsTiNGs LI. 1219 (1969). Many of the
For instance, in Maxon v. Security Insurance Co.,93 the insured brought
an action to recover costs expended in defending (unsuccessfully) a
malicious prosecution action after the insurance company refused to
furnish a defense under the policy. The court held that the malice
established by the judgment against the insured in the original suit
established the occurrence of a "wilful act" within the meaning of
section 533 of the Insurance Code and thus relieved the insurer of
liability. 4 Though Maxon has in part been superseded,95 it illustrates
the fact that a finding of malice, necessary to support a punitive damage
award, has been held to remove the act from insurance coverage.
The question of insurance for punitive damages in California, in
theory at least, is not foreclosed either by the characterization of malice
as implying a wilful act or by the express language of Insurance Code
section 533. Recent case law indicates, for example, that malice need
not always be intentional; 96 furthermore, exceptions to section 533
have been well established. Hence, an act may be malicious and yet
covered by insurance at least as to the compensatory damages, or the
act might be intentional and yet within the policy despite section 533.
leading cases in other jurisdictions have dealt with an award of punitive damages given
against a drunken driver. See cases cited in notes 41, 49, 51, 53, 70 supra. California,
on the contrary, has long had the rule that "[Olne who becomes intoxicated, knowing he
intends to drive his automobile on the highway, is of course negligent, and perhaps
grossly negligent. . . . But it is not a malicious act. California has already ruled that
punitive damages may not be recovered because of the intoxication of an automobile
driver." Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 528, 322 P.2d 933, 940 (1958); accord,
Strauss v. Buckley, 20 Cal. App. 2d 7, 65 P.2d 1352 (1937). Compare Ross v. Clark, 35
Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 (1929), with Dearing v. Ferrell, 165 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Ark.
1958). But see Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948). This strictly
limits the field of application in California of punitive damages for a nonintentional tort.
93. 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963).
94. In Maxon, suit was brought under a storekeeper's policy for malicious prosecu-
tion. Some liability coverage policies provide indemnity for sums arising from such
hazards as malicious prosecution, false arrest or libel, torts which include an element of
malice by their very nature, and thus are particularly subject to punitive damages. It
would seem then that punitive damages are contemplated by such a policy, and some
states have held that the insurer should then be liable. In a Missouri case involving false
arrest insurance, the policy covered the insured "against loss by reason of liability
imposed by law upon the assured, by reason of any false arrest . . . ." Colson v.
Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). In allowing coverage the court
distinguished automobile cases such as Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964), arising in the same state, and which had held that insurance against punitive
damages was contrary to public policy.
95. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966).
96. See note 97 & accompanying text infra.
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A very recent case, G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court,9" has held
that malice need not be intentional. "[Mialice," the court said,
"extends beyond deliberate injury and may characterize aggravated and
culpable instances of nondeliberate conduct. '9 8 The court suggested
"conscious disregard of safety" as a standard for awarding punitive
damages in cases of nondeliberate injury.99 The standard is similar to
that used to define gross negligence, wanton negligence, 00 or reckless
misconduct. 101 The Supreme Court of California has stated that no
form of negligence removes an act from coverage; 02 although there is
no California authority, other courts have held reckless acts to be
covered by insurance. 103 Thus, if an act which is reckless evinced a
conscious disregard of safety, an award of punitive damages would be
supported, but the insurance company could theoretically still be liable
for the compensatory damages arising from the act. In such a case,
97. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
98. Id. at 30, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
99. Id. at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225; see Sturges v. Charles L. Harney, Inc., 165
Cal. App. 2d 306, 322, 331 P.2d 1072, 1081 (1958), in which the court said: "Mhe
courts of this state have long recognized that punitive damages are recoverable for an
area of tortious conduct more culpable than negligence, but falling short of intentional
conduct."
100. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 426, 289 P.2d 218, 221 (1955).
"Wilful misconduct implies at least the intentional doing of something with a knowledge
that serious injury is a probable . . . result, or the intentional doing of an act with a
wanton and reckless disregard of its possible result." Id.
101. See Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 869, 118 P.2d 465, 468
(1941). "[Wanton and reckless misconduct] occurs when a person with no intent to
cause harm intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows,
or should know, it is highly probable that harm will result." Id.
102. See McKenzie v. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co., 112 Cal. 548, 557-58, 44 P.
922, 925 (1896). "Under section 2629 [now section 533 of the Insurance Code] the
nice distinctions often made necessary are dispensed with and the general proposition is
established that no form of negligence on the part of the insured, or his agents or others,
leading to a loss avoids the policy, unless it amounts to a wilful act on the part of the
insured." Id. See also People v. McNutt, 40 Cal. App. 2d 835, 839, 105 P.2d 657, 659
(1940) (even gross negligence is not wilful misconduct).
103. E.g., Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). "Therefore,
wanton and reckless acts of the insured do not amount, in law, to intentional acts so as
to permit an insurer to deny coverage under the provision of a clause, in a liability
insurance policy, which provides that it does not provide coverage for injury intentionally
caused by insured." Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
held: "Negligent conduct may be so gross as to merit characterization as willful and
wanton in the sense of the rule for punitive damages, yet fall far short of an assault and
battery which would distinguish it from an accidental event and withdraw it from the
coverage of the policy. Punitive damages are not limited to assaults and batteries, and
the award of such damages does not convert the case into an assault and battery."
Pennsylvania T. & F. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir.
1957).
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the insured might well contend that his policy providing coverage of
all damages included those intended to be punitory.
Furthermore, although section 533 of the Insurance Code purports
to exclude from coverage any intentional act, there are numerous excep-
tions to this rule: (1) those in which the insurance company failed to
abide by its contractual duty;1 4 (2) workers' compensation cases; 105
(3) instances in which the act was committed by one other than the
insured;106 and (4) cases in which the interpretation of the act as "wil-
ful" was made from the point of view of the injured party.107 Under
these exceptions, cases could arise where the "wilful" act which justi-
fied the imposition of punitive damages was within the policy. For
example, in two cases, liability for damages arising from intentional torts
was held to be covered for collateral reasons relating to the insurance
contracts.
In Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 0 8 the insurer was held
liable for damages arising from an assault and battery. The policy
specifically excluded any liability for bodily injury sustained as a result
of an assault committed by or at the direction of the insured. The
insurance company initially agreed to defend the action with a reserva-
tion of rights if the assault was found to have been outside the bounds
of coverage. But when the complaint against the insured was amended
to include counts of negligence, the attorney for the insurance company
told the insured that the reservation was a nullity, and the company
undertook full defense of the action. This position was reiterated even
after the negligence counts were dismissed. Tomerlin, the insured,
relying on the attorney's representation, withdrew his own attorney and
suffered an adverse judgment. According to the California Supreme
Court, the insurer was estopped to deny liability for the final judgment,
104. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104 (1966).
105. See, e.g., Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
106. See, e.g., Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816
(1955).
107. See generally Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Inten-
tional Torts, 20 HAsTINGs L.J. 1219 (1969). Determination of wilfulness from the
victim's perspective is an approach prevalent in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Huntington
Cab Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 155 F.2d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1946); New
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Messersmith v. American
Fid. Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 165, 133 N.E. 432, 433 (1921). The court in Huntington Cab
Co. observed: "Mhe overwhelming weight of authority holds that an injury is
accidentally received when without the fault of the injured person, it is intentionally
inflicted by another." 155 F.2d at 119.
108. 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964).
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even though based on an intentional tort. The court thus held that the
measure of damages for which the insurance company was liable was
the amount of the entire judgment; however, in this case, no punitive
damages were in fact recovered.
Similarly, in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.,109 a wrongful refusal
to defend resulted in the insurer being held liable for damages arising
from an intentional tort. In that case an action was brought by Jones,
alleging that Gray, the insured, had committed an assault and battery.
The insurer, citing Insurance Code section 533, refused to defend.
Gray unsuccessfully argued self defense, and suffered a judgment of
$6000 actual damages; no punitive damages were awarded. Gray then
brought suit against the insurer on the theory that the defendant had
breached its duty to defend. The Supreme Court of California
affirmed a trial court decision for Dr. Gray, stating that while the exclu-
sionary clause in the policy provided that coverage did not extend to
wilful acts, the provisions regarding the duty to defend was unclear.
The court thus applied the test of the reasonable expectation of the
insured, who would expect the defense to be tendered by the company
even if the ultimate judgment was outside the policy. The court
pointed out that the determination whether the insured acted wilfully
or negligently depended upon the outcome of the very suit the insur-
ance company refused to defend, and that the carrier must defend any
suit which potentially seeks damages within the policy provisions. The
insurer was held liable for the amount of the entire judgment, plus
attorney fees incurred in defending the suit. In both Tomerlin and
Gray, insurers were indirectly required to indemnify for damages aris-
ing out of intentional torts, despite section 533 of the Insurance Code.
Other exceptions to section 533 have been established by Califor-
nia courts. In Azevedo v. Abel,'" the insurance company contended
that the employer's compensation insurance did not provide coverage
for an intentional assault by the employer upon an employee, citing
both section 533 of the Insurance Code and section 1668 of the Civil
Code."' The court held that the statutes were inapplicable, and did
"not prohibit insurance against the employer's ordinary liability for dis-
ability compensation and medical expense, even when occasioned by
his wilful wrong.""'
109. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966); see Crocker, The
Continuing Importance of Gray v. Zurich, 43 L.A.B. BULL. 239 (1968).
110. 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
111. See note 119 infra.
112. Id. at 458, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 714. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4553 (West 1971)
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In Arenson v. National Automobile & Casualty Insurance Co.,113
another exception was established in situations where the tortious act
was committed by one other than the named insured. In that case
plaintiff had a personal liability policy which excluded acts intentionally
caused by or at the direction of the insured. The policy term
"insured" was defined to include the named insured, his spouse and
any other person under twenty-one in his care. Plaintiff's son started
a fire which damaged school property, and the school district obtained
a judgment against the plaintiff. The insurance company refused to
pay the judgment, contending that the exclusionary clause referred to
all those covered by the policy, and that none could recover if the dam-
age was caused intentionally.by any member of that class. The court
rejected this argument, holding that the policy protected the named
insured against liability for intentional injury when committed by
another insured, and that section 533 of the Insurance Code was not
applicable to a situation where the plaintiff was not personally at fault.
This case was later supported by the decision in Nuffer v. Insurance
Co. of North America,"4 in which the Supreme Court of California
held that recovery upon a policy of fire insurance was not defeated by
the fact that the loss for which recovery was sought resulted from the
intentional arson of the insured's agent. 11 5
In addition, California cases have recognized yet another sense in
which an act which can be called wilful or intentional may still be
states: "[C]ompensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half where the
employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful misconduct of [the employer]."
This amount might well be called punitive. Insurance Code section 11661 prohibits
insurance covering this additional compensation. The court in Azevedo held that Civil
Code section 1668 and Insurance Code section 533, if held applicable, would deprive
Insurance Code section 11661 of its function, and said, 'The employer's inability to
insure himself against liability for serious and willful misconduct amply fulfills the public
policy banning insurance which tends to encourage willful injury." 264 Cal. App. 2d at
458, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
113. 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955).
114. 236 Cal. App. 2d 349, 45 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1965).
115. Nuffer involved only the employer's liability for compensatory damages arising
from a tort committed by an employee. However, the holding that Insurance Code
section 533 does not preclude coverage of such an act has bearing on the issue of
vicarious liability for punitive damages as well. It will be urged subsequently that
California courts in appropriate instances allow coverage of punitive damages when the
insured is only vicariously liable, and that the holding that Insurance Code section 533
does not preclude coverage seems to forestall any public policy argument that the intent
and act of the employee should be attributed to the employer to prohibit punitive damage
insurance.
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within coverage. For instance, in Meyer v. Pacific Employers Insur-
ance Co.,110 the court said:
The fact that an act which causes an injury is intentional does not
take the consquences of that act outside the coverage of a policy
which excludes damages unless caused by accident for if the conse-
quence that is the damage or injury is not intentional and is unex-
pected it is accidental in character. 17
Although Meyer involved waterwell drilling, the court cited as an
example an automobile accident. Thus while the act of driving is in-
tentional, an ordinary consequence of which may be an injury to person
or property, "certainly no one would contend that an injury occasioned
by . . .even reckless driving was not accidental within the meaning
of a policy of accident insurance . . . ...'s California thus seems to
have adopted the view that one looks at the event from the point of
the injured party-asking whether he has been in an accident. 19  If
the event and resultant harm happened unexpectedly and without
design on the part of the injured person, the damage is covered by the
policy.
120
Thus, under these various exceptions to section 533 of the Insur-
ance Code, a situation could arise in which the intentional and
malicious character of the act would support an award of punitive dam-
ages and yet the resultant compensatory damages are within policy
coverage. In such a case, the insured might well contend that the puni-
tive award should likewise be covered. However, the case must be one
in which:
1) The insured's actions are determined to be malici-
ous, or less commonly, fraudulent or oppressive, and thus
punitive damages are appropriate under Civil Code section
3294;
2) The insurer's liability for compensatory damages
under the policy is established because the act
a) is malicious but not intentional,
116. 233 Cal. App. 2d 321,43 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1965).
117. Id. at 327, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
118. Id., 43 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
119. See also Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 155 F.2d 117 (4th
Cir. 1946); Richards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170, 26 P. 762 (1891).
120. Traditional analysis characterizes acts purposely done in the absence of
certainty as to the results as either a form of negligence or as recklessness depending on
the probability of the results. See RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 282, comment
d at 500 (1965). See generally id. § 8A.
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b) although wilful, falls into an exception based
on the insurer's wrongful actions,
c) is brought under workers' compensation stat-
utes,
d) was committed by one rather than the named
insured, or
e) is based on a characterization of the results as
accidental although the act was deliberate.
Thus, a strict reading of the applicable California statutes suggests that
it is theoretically possible for a situation to arise in which the liability
of the insurer for punitive damages is at issue. Such would, however,
be a rare case, and in fact, the issue has arisen in only one California
case, which is discussed in some detail below.
The Status of California Case Law
The only California case to consider whether punitive damages as
such could be insured against is United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Janich,121 decided in 1943 by a California federal court in diversity.
In that case the insurance company had issued a policy to the Sanitary
Construction & Engineering Co., a partnership. Janich, a partner in
the company, while in performance of his work, became embroiled in
a dispute with one Berrey and struck him. Berrey sustained personal
injuries and, alleging Janich acted maliciously, sued Janich and the
other partners for compensatory and punitive damages. The insured
partners cross-claimed against their insurance company, arguing that
the policy issued by the company designated assault and battery as an
accident, and thus the insurer was liable for punitive damages. The
court tersely disposed of the issue:
The [insurer's] motion to strike that portion of the cross-claim
relating to exemplary or punitive damages is denied. In Coverage
A, [insurer] agrees: "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of liabil-
ity imposed by law ... " Such a broad provision would embrace
punitive damages.'
12
This case has been cited as one which construes punitive damages as
within the contractual language.123 It is of only limited precedential
value in attempting a prediction of California's stand on the issue; the
121. 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
122. Id. at 19.
123. iSee Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 439 n.15 (5th Cir.
1972).
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policy involved contained an exceptionally broad provision unlike
policies in use today;124 the opinion does not explicitly address the pub-
lic policy issue; the decision was rendered by a federal court which,
lacking previous cases on point, could only predict how California courts
would handle the issue; and most important, the case involved the
liability of a partnership for the act of a partner,125 a special situation
involving a type of vicarious liability.
California's Position on the Public Policy Issue
Even if it is proper to cite Janich as authority for the proposition
that punitive damages are covered as a matter of construction by an
ordinary contract of insurance, the question whether such coverage is
contrary to public policy remains to be answered.'2 In the absence
of direct authority, the answer lies in analogy. The Supreme Court of
California, for example, in both Tomerlin127 and Gray 28 discussed the
public policy question and found that the purpose behind section 1668
of the Civil Code 29 and section 533 of the Insurance Code is to deter
tortious acts by denying the actors the possibility of contracting to shift
responsibility for their intentional torts to another. In Tomerlin, the
court justified its decision to hold the insurer liable in this way:
Although an insurer may not indemnify against liability caused by
the insured's wilful wrong. . . defendant's liability here does not
arise from a contract executed prior to plaintiff's wilful misconduct,
but from an estoppel which arose after it. Section 1668 of the
Civil Code and section 533 of the Insurance Code establish a public
policy to prevent insurance coverage from encouragement of wilful
torts.... Recovery under a subsequent estoppel does not offend
such public policy.
130
124. The policy in use in .anich read: 'To pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed by law
." 3 F.R.D. at 19. In contrast a more modem policy would read: "To pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage." This was the wording at issue in
both Carroway and Hills as well as most other cases discussed herein. See notes 1-2
supra.
125. See notes 152-53, 168-70 & accompanying text infra.
126. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1668 (West 1973) is pertinent here: "All contracts which
have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law,
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law."
127. 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964).
128. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
129. See note 126 supra.
130. 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648, 394 P.2d 571, 577-78, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 737-38 (1964)
(citations omitted). In Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th
Cir. 1962), the insured also argued that the insurance company was estopped to deny
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Similarly, in Gray, in rejecting the insurer's contention that coverage
of the assault and battery would violate public policy under these sec-
tions, Justice Tobriner said:
The contention fails on two grounds. In the first place, the statutes
forbid only contracts which indemnify for "loss" or "responsibility"
resulting from wilful wrongdoing. Here we deal with a contract
which provides for legal defense against an action charging such
conduct; the contract does not call for indemnification of the
insured if the third party plaintiff prevails. In the second place
.. .the statutes "establish a public policy to prevent insurance
coverage from encouragement of wilful tort." . . .[A] contract
to defend an assured upon mere accusation of a wilful tort does
not encourage such wilful conduct. 13'
Thus it is apparent that under section 3294 of the Civil Code the pur-
pose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer. The public
policy behind section 1668 of the Civil Code and section 533 of the
Insurance Code is one of discouraging tortious acts. These policies are
the same as those expressed in McNulty, and thus the statement in that
case should govern: "Where a person is able to insure himself against
punishment he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the
liability. The court rejected this argument: "Consistency compels us to hold, however,
that since public policy forbids an insurer and an insured to enter into an insurance
contract covering punitive damages, public policy forbids the accomplishment of the
result by an estoppel." Id. at 442. See also American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523
(10th Cir. 1966).
131. 65 Cal. 2d at 277-78, 419 P.2d at 177, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 113. In Ging v.
American Liberty Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 756 (D. Fla. 1968), the situation involved was
similar to that of the California cases here discussed. The plaintiff brought an action
charging the defendant insurance company with bad faith and negligence in handling
negotiations to settle a claim of the insured. The issue decided by the court was whether
an insured could recover the amount of a judgment against him in excess of the limits of
the policy on the basis of the insurer's bad faith refusal to settle, where the amount of
the excess judgment represented punitive damages. The court held that the insurance
company's conduct in declining to accept the offer to settle caused no legally compensa-
ble damage to the insured. "The question of the insurer's good or bad faith is never
reached, since, with respect to the claim for punitive damages, there was no duty not to
act in bad faith ....
"In this Court's opinion, the decision reached here is not only consistent with, but
dictated by, the public policy considerations discussed in the McNulty opinion. It places
the full and final responsibility for reprehensible conduct squarely where it should be-
on the shoulders of the actor. Any other rule would allow him to shift at least partial
responsibility to his insurer in the guise of suits-such as this-for bad faith refusal to
settle." Id. at 761-62.
In both Tomerlin and Gray, the insurer was held liable for the "entire judgment."
The insurer might have been held responsible for punitive damages if the judgment had
included such an award. In neither case were punitive damages recovered in fact, but
the reasoning in Ging does seem more consistent with the underlying rationale of public
policy,
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establishment of sanctions against such misconduct."'18 2  These consid-
erations would appear to require the California courts to carry their
established public policy argument to its logical conclusion by placing
the financial burden of the punishment (as distinguished from compen-
satory damages) on the tortfeasor himself. Moreover, this conclusion
is also supported by an analogy to California suretyship cases, which
establish a clear policy of refusing to impose liability for punitive dam-
ages on one other than the actual wrongdoer.
Although suretyship and insurance contracts are clearly distinct,
rules of construction and interpretation are similar, as are the underly-
ing functions.'8 3 Thus, while statutory bonds are construed with refer-
ence to the statutes bearing upon them, ordinary undertakings of sure-
ties are private contracts, and are interpreted like any other contract.8 4
Given the similarity between surety bonds and insurance contracts, the
California rule that a surety is not liable for punitive damages should
provide persuasive support for an adoption of an analogous rule exclud-
ing punitive damages from an insurance policy.
The limits of the liability of a surety are well established in this
state. In Carter v. Agricultural Insurance Co.,135 the defendant was the
surety on an attachment bond issued to codefendants, the Palmers,
obligating him to pay all costs awarded the plaintiff and "all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, not exceeding the
132. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. MeNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962).
133. See, e.g., Klinell v. Shirey, 223 Cal. App. 2d 239, 35 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1963).
134. See 46 CAL. JuR. 2D Suretyship & Guaranty § 17 (1959). In one California
case, the court said: "An attachment bond is in actuality a type of insurance. It is
insurance that the defendant in an attachment action. will be paid, within the limits of
the bond, any damages he sustains by reason of the levy." Klinell v. Shirey, 223 Cal.
App. 239, 246, 35 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906 (1963).
135. 266 Cal. App. 2d 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1968). The opinion designated the
question as one of first impression in California, distinguishing Barlin v. Barlin, 156 Cal.
App. 2d 143, 319 P.2d 87 (1957), in which an award including punitive damages against
a surety was affirmed, as not raising the question involved in Carter, and distinguishing
as dicta statements in Klinell v. Shirey, 223 Cal. App. 2d 239, 245, 35 Cal. Rptr. 901,
906 (1963). See also Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220 Ark. 25, 245 S.W.2d 818
(1952); Yesel v. Watson, 58 N.D. 524, 226 N.W. 624 (1929); United States Fire Ins.
Co. v. McDaniel, 408 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. App. 1966); 6 AM. JuR. 2D Attachment and
Garnishment § 635 (1971). Contra, State ex rel. Coffelt v. Hartford Ace. & Indem.
Co., 44 Tenn. App. 405, 314 S.W.2d 161 (19,58); Garner v. State ex reL Askins, 37
Tenn. App. 510, 266 S.W.2d 358 (1953). Section 190 of the Restatement of Security
provides: 'The liability of a surety on an attachment bond extends within the penal
limits of the bond to all loss sustained by the defendant in consequence of a wrongful
attachment including reasonable expense incurred by the defendant in procuring a
dissolution of the attachment, but does not include exemplary damages which may be
recovered against the plaintiff for malicious prosecution or other reasons."
sum specified in the undertaking.' 1 36 The plaintiff Carter brought suit
for a wrongful and malicious attachment; the trial court awarded him
compensatory and punitive damages amounting to a sum well within
the limits of the bond. The plaintiff insurance company appealed the
judgment, protesting its liability for a punitive award. The court
resolved the issue by examining the pertinent code:
The issue here may be resolved by statutory construction of the
words all damages sustained by the attachee. The attachee does
not sustain punitive or exemplary damages. These are imposed on
the attachor as punishment for his malice.. . . We hold an under-
taking to secure those obligations set forth in the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, section 539 does not obligate a surety to pay punitive or
exemplary damages imposed for malicious attachment. l3 7
In Tennessee, which has upheld coverage of punitive damages,138
suretyship cases are contrary to those of California. Judge White, in
Lazenby,5 9 felt the analogy between insurance and suretyship was
close enough to allow this policy to operate as support for holding the
insurer liable for punitive damages levied against the insured. 40 Hence,
a jurisdicition holding contrary to Tennessee on surety liability might
also hold contrary to Tennessee on the question of coverage for puntive
damages under an insurance policy.
1-41
136. 266 Cal. App. 2d 805, 806, 72 Cal. Rptr. 462, 464 (1968), quoting CAL. CODE
Civ. PRoc. § 539 (West 1954).
137. 266 Cal. App. 2d 805, 807, 72 Cal. Rptr. 462, 464 (1968). See also Ross v.
Sweeters, 119 Cal. App. 716, 724, 7 P.2d 334, 338 (1932). "[W]here the sheriff and
his bondsmen would be liable for compensatory damages they would not be liable for
punitive or exemplary damages unless they had knowledge of the conduct of the agent
and had acquiesced in or ratified his actions." Id.
138. See notes 56-57 & accompanying text supra.
139. Lazenby v. Universal Und. Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964)
(concurring opinion).
140. Id. at 653-54, 383 S.W.2d at 8.
141. In Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d
582 (1969), the court found the insurer liable for punitive damages, distinguishing an
earl.er Arkansas case, Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, on the ground that damages in
Arnold had been governed solely by statute. Judge Fogleman registered a strong dissent,
arguing that Arnold should control and citing language from that opinion: "Punitive
damages are imposed to punish the wrongdoer, not to compensate the plaintiff for the
officer's breach of duty. It is therefore generally held that the surety is not liable for
punitive damages unless the statute so provides." Id. at 861, 440 S.W.2d at 588, quoting
Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220 Ark. 25, 27-28, 245 S.W.2d 818, 819 (1952).
Fogleman continued: "The false imprisonment was clearly a breach of that bond, so
there was just as much justification for recovery of the punitive damages from the surety
as there is for recovery from appellant here." Id. at 861-62, 440 S.W.2d at 588; cf.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (1947), holding that
decisions relieving sureties on official bonds from liability for punitive damages were not
in point, since in such cases the bond required only that the surety compensate the party
for actual damages. See also Gonsoulin, Is an Award of Punitivie Damages Covered
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A Necessary Exception: Insurance for Punitive Damages
in Cases of Vicarious Liability
In the foregoing discussion of insurance coverage for punitive
damages, the cases have involved a tortfeasor seeking recovery from
his insurance company for the penalty attached to his misdeed. Be-
cause of his personal involvement, jurisdictions denying coverage have
reasoned that it is violative of public policy to allow the actor to escape
the punitory consequences of his tort.'42 However, when an element of
vicarious liability is added, the equities shift-the insured is held respon-
sible by the injured party for an act he did not commit, and seeks reim-
bursement from his insurer for a judgment of punitive damages against
him for the tort of his servant. Of those states which have faced this is-
sue, all but one have allowed insurance coverage of the award.143  This
section will explore insurance coverage of punitive damages in the con-
text of the vicarious liability of individual employers, partnerships, and
corporations. The analysis will first briefly cover the holding as estab-
lished in other jurisdictions, and then will examine the California law in
this area.
Liability for Punitive Damages: Individual Employers
The leading case establishing a policy of coverage in a case involv-
ing vicarious liability is Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance
Co.' 44 In this case, an action was brought against the insured for
Under an Automobile or Comprehensive Liability Policy? 22 Sw. L.J. 433 (1968);
Comment, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517 (1957).
142. See notes 51-55 & accompanying text supra.
143. See Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d
582 (1969); Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Florida
law); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 III. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969);
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934) (applying Missouri law), cert.
denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793
(1966) (dicta); General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956)
(applying Tennessee law); cf., Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Co., 199 F.2d
60 (4th Cir. 1952). It should be noted that Illinois and Arkansas have addressed the
issue of insurance coverage for punitive damages only in the vicarious liability context.
Cf. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943). But see
Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934), in which the
policy was issued to the Hertz rental system, to cover renters of cars. One Callahan
rented a car, and while intoxicated, caused a collision injuring the plaintiff. The court
rejected any liability of the insurer for insuring punitive damages. Under similar facts,
the Idaho Supreme Court found coverage of the punitive damages, but did not base its
decision on the vicarious liability issue. Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973).
144. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
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damages sustained by one Dauster caused by an act of the insured's
servant. The injured party prayed for a punitive award in addition to
compensatory damages, claiming that the act was done "in a reckless
disregard of plaintiff's rights and safety."'1 45 The action was settled for
$9000, and the insured subsequently brought suit against the insurance
company to recover $5000 pursuant to the insurance company's stipula-
tion that it was liable for this sum if it was determined that the policy
covered punitive damages. The insurance company argued that the
terms of the policy did not cover punitive damages, and that, even if
they did, such coverage would be contrary to public policy. The court
acknowledged that a grave question of validity would arise if one tried
to protect himself from the consequences of his wilful acts, "since it
might well be said that it would be against public policy to permit a
person to protect himself in advance against the consequences of inten-
tional wrongdoing injurious to others."'1 46  But the court distinguished
the instant case wherein the sole liability of the insured was predicated
upon the relationship of master and servant:
If the master participates in, authorizes, or knows in advance that
his servant will probably commit the unlawful injurious act, then
the situation may be analogous to where the insured himself com-
mits an intentional act with an intended injury and the same
reasons for holding a protecting policy invalid as to such acts would
exist. . . . In this situation where there was no direct or indirect
volition upon the part of the master in the commission of the act,
no public policy is violated by protecting him from the unauthor-
ized and unnatural act of his servant. 147
However, this extension of coverage to vicarious liability situations
will not be an issue in every case. Many states, including California, 4 '
do not allow an award of punitive damages against one whose liability
is only vicarious; in these jurisdictions the question of vicarious liability
for punitive damages does not arise, as punitive damages are assessed
against the master only when he participates in, authorizes, or rati-
fies the act.' 49 In such cases liability must be personal before puni-
145. Id.
146. Id. at 60.
147. Id.; accord, Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 852,
440 S.W.2d 582, 584 (1969). "[W]e can perceive of no good reason why an employer
should be prohibited from insuring himself against such losses, since the losses are in
effect a business loss-i.e. a calculated risk of doing business." 242 Ark. at 852, 440
S.W.2d at 584. "Public policy is not violated by insurance in such a situation anymore
than it would be if a newspaper took out insurance for libel." Northwestern Nat'l
Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962).
148. See notes 162-64 & accompanying text infra.
149. See 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 258 (1965).
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rive damages can be assessed, and coverage would be decided pur-
suant to the theories previously discussed.15°' Other states, however,
permit assessment of punitive damages against the employer whenever
the employee-tortfeasor has acted within the scope of his employment,
that is, whenever the employer would be liable for compensatory dam-
ages under the doctrine of respondeat superior.' 5 ' Having thus
expanded the master's liability for punitive damages, the courts then
have allowed him to pass along such liability to his insurance company.
Liability for Punitive Damages: Partnerships
In a partnership situation, only one case outside California dis-
cusses insurance for punitive damages. In Malanga v. Manufacturer's
Casualty Insurance Co.,'52 a comprehensive liability policy was issued
to a partnership. Under the policy the defendant insurer undertook
"to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury
.. .caused by accident."'"3 Assault and battery was designated an
accident unless committed by or at the direction of the insured. One
of the partners committed an assault and battery on a third party, who
sued the partnership and won a jury verdict which included punitive
damages. When the insurer refused to satisfy the judgment, the part-
nership brought suit. The court held that the assaulting partner was
excluded from coverage since as to him the assault was not an acci-
dent (and thus he would be liable to the insurer under subrogation),
150. See notes 51-66 & accompanying text supra.
151. See 22 Am. Ju. 2D Damages § 261 (1965). Most states have spoken only
regarding vicarious liability between master and servant or corporation and employee.
However, Florida has recently extended coverage for punitive damages under vicarious
liability to a situation in which the owner of an automobile was held liable for the act of
the driver. In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 261 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972), the
Wilsons had sustained injuries in a collision with a vehicle owned by Miller and operated
by Johnston, and they sued both of them for punitive and compensatory damages. There
was no allegation of an employer-employee relationship. The court did not pass on the
correctness of the lower court's holding that an owner's vicarious liability would subject
him to punitive damages for the gross negligence of one to whom he had entrusted the
vehicle. The court addressed itself only to the question whether, assuming vicarious
liability rendered the owner liable, the owner was covered for a punitive award by his
insurance policy. It held: "[I]f punitive damages are assessed against Miller solely on
the basis of vicarious liability arising out of ownership, and not because of any active
wrongdoing or misconduct on his part which would itself justify imposition of punitive
damages, then such damages are within the insuring agreement of appellant's policy
." Id. at 548.
152. 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958).
153. Id. at 223, 146 A.2d at 106.
but that coverage would extend to the partnership entity unless the
assault could be said to have been committed at the direction of
the partnership. The insurer argued that insurance coverage was con-
trary to public policy because the act, perpetrated in the course of part-
nership business, was that of the partnership. The court rejected this
contention, distinguishing between the act of the agent and the liability
of the principal, and held that the partnership entity, distinct from its
members, was entitled to the indemnity which it had purchased.
Liability for Punitive Damages: Corporations
Early cases on corporate liability held that torts of an agent were
personal wrongs of the employee, and not torts of the corporation,
reasoning that a corporation could not do an act unauthorized by its
charter.'14  This doctrine was soon repudiated,' 55 and a corporation is
now clearly held liable for compensatory damages arising from the acts
of its agents committed within the scope of employment.' 56 At one
time it was also held that a corporation would not be liable for a tort
involving intent or malice as an essential element, but even this limita-
tion no longer exists.' 57 Some states, including California, hold the cor-
porate entity liable for punitive damages only upon a showing of par-
ticipation in, or authorization or ratification of the act by one repre-
senting the corporation.' 5 In an equal number of states, the rule is
that a corporation is responsible for punitive damages for any act of
its agent or servant within the scope of employment which would sub-
ject the employee himself to punitive damages, whether or not that act
was authorized or ratified by the corporation.'59 Regardless of the
theory under which a corporation can be held liable for punitive dam-
ages, insurance seems intuitively to be a desirable way to prevent the
154. E.g., Orr v. Bank of the United States, 1 Ohio 37, 13 Am. Dec. 588 (1823).
155. See, e.g., Hussey v. King, 98 N.C.34, 3 S.E. 923 (1887); Standard Oil Co. v.
State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705 (1907). In one case, the court said, "Of course, no
corporation can lawfully authorize the doing of an unlawful act, or of a tortious or
negligent act. Neither can an individual acquire a right to commit a tort; but the
absence of the right to do that which is wrong will not absolve him from the
consequences of the wrong." Clinchfield Fuel Co. v. Henderson Iron Works Co., 254 F.
411, 416 (5th Cir, 1918).
156. See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1285 (1940).
157. See Philadelphia, W. & B.R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 flow.) 202 (1858);
Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 529 (1853).
158. See generally 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 258 (1965).
159. Id. § 261. For a collection of cases from both types of states, see Note, The
Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of his
Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961).
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ultimate imposition of a punitive award on the innocent shareholders
of the enterprise. Illinois is the only state to have considered the insur-
ability of corporate liability for punitive damages, and has allowed
insurance coverage for a punitive award against the corporation.' 60  In
Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., the court said, "There is no reasonable
basis to declare the latter type of insurance is against public policy.'1'
s
California's Position on Vicarious Liability
In California, a recent case, Hale v. Farmer's Insurance Ex-
change,62 stated that a principal's liability for punitive damages result-
ing from his agent's acts conformed to that set forth in section 909 of
the Restatement of Torts. This section would allow punitive damages
against a principal b5ecause of the act of an agent if but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act,
or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in em-
ploying him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting within the scope of employment, or
(d) the employer or a manager of the employer ratified or ap-
proved the act.
16 3
In the case of a master-servant relationship, where the servant is
not employed in a managerial position, California follows a narrow rule,
forbidding liability for punitive damages from being imposed upon a
principal in the absence of proof of some actual culpability on his
part.'-6  But such culpability is satisfied by a showing of participation,
160. Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Jll. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969); cf.
Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir: 1952). In Glen
Falls, a jury gave a verdict against the defendant insured for $250 actual damages and
$2,500 punitive damages. The case was then settled for $2,700, and the court held the
insurance company liable for the entire amount.
161. Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 III. App. 2d 133, 137, 245 N.E.2d 124, 126
(1969).
162. 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 691, 117 Cal. Rptr. 146, 153 (1974). In Hale the court
said, "While an employer may be liable for an employee's tort under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, he is not responsible for punitive damages where he neither directed
nor ratified the act." Id. at 690, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
163. Id. at 691, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
164. See Deevy v. Tass, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 130 P.2d 389 (1942); Evans v. Gibson,
220 Cal. 476, 31 P.2d 389 (1934); Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 99 Cal. Rptr.
706 (1972); Weber v. Leuschner, 240 Cal. App. 2d 829, 50 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1966). Of
course, the master is liable for compensatory damages under respondeat superior, and the
fact that the agent's act was intentional will not remove the act from coverage under the
master's policy. See notes 110-14 supra.
authorization or ratification. The rationale for this rule was expressed
long ago in Davis v. Hearst:'65
Since the animus malus must be shown to exist in every case before
an award in punitive damages may be made against a defendant,
since the evil motive is the controlling and essential factor which
justifies such an award, it follows of necessity that no principal can
be held in punitive damages for the act of his agent, unless the par-
ticular act comes within the principal's specific direction or general
suggestions, or unless the principal has subsequently ratified it;
such ratification presupposing, it is said, original authorization.' 66
Under this narrow California rule, the question of whether a principal's
insurance covers punitive damages resulting from the act of his agent
would not arise, since the master would not in any event be liable for
punitive damages unless he himself was in some measure culpable.
And, as has been discussed, 16 7 where he is a joint tortfeasor by means
of his authorization or ratification, section 533 of the Insurance Code
and section 1668 of the Civil Code would preclude insurance for the
punitive award. Thus, if California were to adopt the principle of non-
coverage for punitive damages, as advocated by McNulty, there would
be no need for an exception for vicarious liability in the ordinary master-
servant situation.
As for partnership liability for punitive damages, United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Janich6 s is the only California case in this
field, and provides an example of partnership insurance for a punitive
award. A wrongful assault and battery by Janich, a partner in the in-
sured firm, was held to be covered by the partnership policy which
designated assault and battery an accident. Although the vicarious
liability issue was not litigated, 169 punitive damages were imposed on
the partnership for the act and held by the court to be covered by the
policy. By this coverage, the innocent partners were protected from
liability for the unauthorized act. This holding is reasonable. There
seems to be no public policy barrier to insurance coverage in favor of
the partnership entity. 70
165. 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911). For similar rules in other states see
Comment, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in its Application to Corporations, 9
MICH. L. REv. 337, 338 (1911).
166. 160 Cal. 143, 164-65, 116 P. 530, 540 (1911).
167. See notes 91, 126 & accompanying text supra.
168. 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
169. Coverage here was found under a construction of the policy. Id. at 19.
170. Although the opinion made no mention of Janich's own liability, it would seem
that he, as the tortfeasor, ought not to profit from the insurance coverage. In the only
other partnership case on point, the court held the assaulting partner was excluded from
coverage. Malanga v. Manufacturer's Casualty Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105
(1958). See text accompanying notes 152-53 supra.
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Where the employee is acting as a "manager" in a master-
servant relationship, and especially in a corporate setting, liability of the
employer for punitive damages in California is more expansive than in
a simple master-servant situation, in accordance with section 909(c) of
the Restatement of Torts..71  Comment a to this section states the
rationale for such liability:
Although there has been no fault on the part of a corporation or
other employer, where a person acting in a managerial capacity
either does an outrageous act or approves of such an act by a
subordinate, the imposition of punitive damages upon the employer
serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for
important positions.
1 7 2
Thus, under California law, a corporation is liable for both com-
pensatory and punitive damages assessed against a corporate official
acting within the scope of his employment. Because of his rank, such
an official's act and wrongful intent are imputed to the corporation.
1 73
For example, as early as 1897 the California Supreme Court in
Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.174 declared:
The Directors are the chosen representatives of the corporation,
and constitute. . . to all purposes of dealing with others, the cor-
poration. What they do within the scope of the objects and pur-
poses of the corporation, the corporation does. If they do an injury
to another, even though it necessarily involves in its commission a
malicious intent, the corporation must be deemed by imputation to
be guilty of the wrong, and answerable for it, as an individual
would be in such a case.' 7 5
Even where the act complained of is performed by a menial servant,
the corporation is held liable for punitive damages when such act was
done with the knowledge or under the direction of a corporate official
having power to bind the corporation.1 76  Where high level manage-
171. See note 162 & accompanying text supra.
172. RESTATEM NT (SEcoND) oF TouRs § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
173. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. White, 104 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1939); Lowe
v. Yolo County Consol. Water Co., 157 Cal. 503, 108 P. 297 (1910); Maynard v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48 (1867).
174. 34 Cal. 48 (1867).
175. Id. at 57. See also Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
176. See Alterauge v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 97 Cal. App. 2d 735, 218 P.2d 802
(1950); McInerney v. United R.R., 50 Cal. App. 538, 195 P. 958 (1920). In
Mclnerney, the rourt said, "lilt is undoubtedly the law that a corporation may become
liable in exemplary damages where an act of one of its employee, done in ill will or in
actual malice ... is done with the knowledge or under the express direction of its
superior officials having power to bind the corporation, or, if done without such
knowledge or direction, is thereafter ratified by such officials, with full knowledge as to
the willful and malicious quality of such acts .... ." Id. at 549, 195 P. at 962.
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ment has knowledge of the tortious act, corporate responsibility is
established.17
7
Should Corporations Be Able To Insure for Punitive Damages
Assessed Against Them? A Proposed New Rule
We have seen that in many states, punitive damages can be
assessed against an employer even when the employer is not involved
in the tortious act of an employee. Furthermore, in all states, an
employer-especially a corporate employer-can be liable for puni-
tive damages when an employee with managerial authority commits a
tort in the scope of his employment.
Insurability of punitive damages is an issue particularly complex
in the context of corporate liability. It is tempting to say that since
a corporation can only act through its agents, a corporation can only
act vicariously, and thus should always be able to insure itself as an
entity against acts committed by any of its agents. One commentator
has argued that, since corporate structure entails division of manage-
ment and ownership with the result that financial liability for torts of
the management ultimately rests on the innocent shareholders, corpora-
tions should never bear the brunt of punitive damages. 78 If this argu-
ment is to be accepted, it could be further argued that corporations
should be freely allowed to insure themselves against punitive damages,
since it is not inconsistent with public policy to allow insurance where
a defendant's liability is merely vicarious, and not the result of personal
wrongdoing.
79
Such a position overlooks two very fundamental arguments. First,
embedded in the law is the notion that when an employer authorizes,
ratifies or participates in an act of an employee for which he can be
assessed punitive damages, that employer is just as liable for punitive
damages as is the employee.'s 0 An employer should not be able to
escape the impact of this basic principle merely by incorporating him-
self. If a corporation reaps the benefits of acts of corporate officers
done on behalf of the corporation, it seems only fair that the corpora-
177. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967).
178. Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the
Malicious Torts of his Employees, 70 YALE L.i. 1296 (1961).
179. See notes 142-61 & accompanying text supra.
180. See, e.g., Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 240 P. 530 (1911); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2170 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 909 (Tent.
Draft No. 19, 1973).
[Vol. 28
November 1976] INSURANCE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 467
tion accept responsibility when that officer commits a tort in the hope
that this corporation will be benefited. Second, such a position over-
looks the McNulty argument that insurance dissipates the deterrent
effect of punitive damages. In fact, given the enormous corporate
Wealth and power in America, a policy of deterrence as to corporations
seems especially vital.
On the other hand, where corporate liability is genuinely vicarious,
equity demands that a corporation be treated no differently from an
individual (such as an employer) who has been assessed punitive dam-
ages through respondeat superior. Where an individual has been
allowed to insure himself against vicarious liability for punitive dam-
ages, it is only fair that a corporation be likewise able to insure itself
on behalf of its innocent shareholders.' Thus, in order to assure an
equitable solution allowing for maximum corporate insurability consis-
tent with the long standing public policy against encouraging tortious
conduct, the following rule is proposed:
Corporations should be able to insure themselves against liability
for punitive damages when the insurance company, through subro-
gation, would be able to recover an indemnity from the corporate
agents who originally caused the corporation to incur the liability.
Such a rule is based on the theory that all liability-causing acts of
corporate agents-and it is to be remembered that a corporation can
act only through its agents-are divisible into two classes. One class
involves acts in the scope of employment for which corporations, like
any employer, are liable by operation of law.'8" The second class of
liability-causing acts are managerial in nature, usually done specifically
to benefit the economic fortunes of the corporation. Since it has been
held that the act of a manager is the act of the corporation, 8  this latter
class ordinarily should be the corporate equivalent of an employer's
personal involvement in a tort. For such personal involvement an
181. A shareholder's power of management is strictly limited both legally and
effectively. See e.g., H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 42-43 (rev. ed. 1946); A.
BERLE, & G. MEANS, Tim MODERN CORPORATION AND PiVATE PROPERTY 153-206
(1932). For this reason it can be said that a shareholder has not participated in the
tort; hence, to place the burden of the penalty upon the shareholder seems to violate the
established tenet that guilt is personal. See Lake Shore & M. No. Ry. v. Prentice, 147
U.S. 101 (1893).
182. See Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 31 P.2d 389 (1934); New York Cent. &
II.R.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
34 Cal. 48 (1867); RESTATEE NT (SEcoND) OF AGENcY § 219(1) (1958).
183. See Lowe v. Yolo County Water Co., 157 Cal. 503, 108 P. 297 (1910);
Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48 (1867).
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individual employer would be liable for punitive damages,8 4 and
should not be able to insure against the risk; corporations should be
no different. The rule proposed above is designed to provide an easy
guide for distinguishing those situations in which a corporate entity is
"personally" involved in a tort from those in which it is only involved
because an employee has committed what could be loosely called an
"unauthorized" tort.
This rule has its complexities. Punitive damages imputed to the
corporation because of a nonmanagerial tortious act are a risk that
should be insurable under the theory of vicarious liability,'"5 but puni-
tive damages stemming from certain managerial acts should also be in-
surable risks. Before these complexities are explored, however, there
should be a brief discussion of the principle of subrogation.
Subrogation entities the insurer, upon payment to the insured, to
sue anyone against whom the insured had a cause of action.' 86 In other
words, the insurance company steps into the shoes of the insured and,
in actions against those liable to the insured, is entitled to the same
rights18 and is subject to the same defenses as the insured.188  Thus,
under this proposed rule, insurability of punitive damages assessed
against the corporation depends upon whether the agent committing the
tort violated a duty to the corporation. If a duty was violated, the cor-
poration has a cause of action against the employee; if the corporation
has a cause of action, the insurance company can sue in subrogation;
where the insurance company can sue in subrogation, insurability of
corporate punitive damages should be allowed.
To illustrate the equities of such a rule, its application in several
situations will be posed. Assume first that a corporate employee
charged with only ministerial duties commits, in the scope of his
employment, the kind of tort for which not only he but also his em-
ployer can be assessed punitive damages. Assume further that the
injured victim joins both the employee and the employer, winning a
184. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19,
1973). See text accompanying note 147 supra.
185. See notes 143-47 & accompanying text supra.
186. Standard Marine Ins. Co. v. Scottish Metropolitan Assurance Co., 283 U.S.
284 (1931); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 175 U.S. 91 (1899);
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunwoody, 194 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1952).
187. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 175 U.S. 91 (1899);
Wager v. Providence Ins. Co., 150 U.S. 99 (1893).
188. Royal Indem. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 38 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Ohio 1939),
afr'd, 119 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1941); Royal Indem. Co. v. Security Truck Lines, 212 Cal.
App. 2d 61, 27 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1963).
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punitive damage award for which both parties are jointly liable. Insur-
ance coverage for punitive damages in such a case would not violate
public policy, since the employer in such a situation is not personally
guilty of socially outrageous behavior.189 In such a situation, the
employee who committed the tort has violated a duty of care which by
law he owes to his employer.' If the employer is a corporation, the
insurance company covering the risk would theoretically have a cause
of action in subrogation against the employee. Thus, insurance for
punitive damages should be allowed; the insurance company covering
the loss would be able to pass the ultimate burden of the punitive dam-
ages back to the employee, and the penalty would settle upon the most
blameworthy party. The McNulty doctrine of deterrence is admirably
served by this; the innocent corporate employer is not ultimately liable
for the penalty, while the actual tortfeasor is not only liable for the puni-
tive damages in the original action filed against him by the injured
party, but is also faced with a second action against him in subrogation
for whatever part of that award the corporate employer was forced to
assume. Thus, the party to blame for the tort is even more likely to
be deterred from such conduct.' 9 '
Second, let us shift our attention to the corporate board room
where various corporate officers and directors with managerial authority
are considering the wisdom of a proposed business transaction with a
third party. The proposition is potentially fraudulent, and corpo-
rate managers weigh the decision carefully. They decide that, al-
though certain risks attend the scheme, the chance for huge corporate
gain outweighs the chance of incurring civil liability for the fraud. The
189. Note, however, that California at least has adopted the view that a principal is
liable for punitive damages if the agent was unfit and the principal was negligent in
hiring him. See Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 117 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1974), quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 213, 2170 (1958).
190. RrSTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY §§ 377, 400-01 (1958).
191. Officers of a corporation are liable to it when they are guilty of a breach or
neglect of any duties owing by them to the corporation which proximately results in a
loss to the corporation. See, e.g., Wallach v. Billings, 277 fI1. 218, 155 N.E. 382 (1917),
cert. denied, 244 U.S. 659 (1917); ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. CODE ANN. 2D § 48, 1
(1971 & Supp. 1974). However, management rarely enforces the corporation's right to
indemnity from an insider. See Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance
Against Directors' and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. I.Aw. 92, 108 & n.65 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Bishop]. Further, the corporation's common law right of indemni-
ty against its employees is eliminated, since the corporation's liability policies usually
include as additional assureds the directors, officers and employees of the corporation.
See Brook, Officers' and Directors' Liability Insurance, 2 TBE FORUM 228, 232 (1967).
However, it seems logical that economic realities would ensure that the insurance
company, unlike the corporation, would enforce its right over against the tortfeasor.
transaction is carried out, but the third party, discovering the fraud,
joins both the corporate managers and the corporation in an action,
winning a judgment of punitive damages for which both the officers
and the corporation are liable. Here the corporate managers have vio-
lated no duty to the corporation, as they are protected by the "business
judgment rule."192  That rule holds that managerial personnel, in need
of free and unhampered discretion to manage a corporation's business
affairs, are not liable for financial losses incurred by faulty business
judgment unless (1) the managers were negligent in informing them-
selves of the underlying situation upon which the decision was based, 9 '
(2) the managers were financially self-interested in the decision, 1 or
(3) it was the kind of decision that no reasonable businessman would
have made (i.e. waste).' 95 The hypothetical situation here presup-
poses that none of these three elements are present, and therefore no
duty to the corporation has been violated. Consequently, there is no
cause of action to which the insurance company can be subrogated; to
allow insurance of the punitive damages assessed against the corpora-
tion would violate public policy, as the tortfeasor would escape any
penalty. This application of the rule comports well with McNulty's
deterrence objective: where the managers are not liable to the cor-
poration, allowing the corporation to pass the cost of the punitive dam-
ages to the insurance company would negate any financial incentive for
192. This rule has been described as follows: "If in the course of management,
directors arrive at a decision, within the corporation's powers (intra vires) and their
authority, for which there is a reasonable basis, and they act in good faith, as the result
of their independent discretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration
other than what they honestly believe to be the best interests of the corporation, a court
will not interfere with internal management and substitute its judgment for that of the
directors to enjoin or set aside the transaction or to surcharge the directors for any
resulting loss." H. HENN, CORPOPArIONS § 242 (2d ed. 1970).
193. It is well established that the rule exempting officers of corporations from
liability for mere mistakes and errors of judgment does not apply where the loss is the
result of a failure to exercise proper diligence and care. "When courts say that they will
not interfere in matters of business judgment, it is presupposed that judgment-reasona-
ble diligence-has in fact been exercised. A director cannot close his eyes to what is
going on about him in the conduct of the business of the corporation and have it said
that he is exercising business judgment." Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643
(Sup. Ct. 1944).
194. It is also a cardinal principle that a director cannot make a secret profit out of
his official position. See, e.g., Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107,
412 P.2d 47 (1966); Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 246 P. 1049 (1926); Golden Rod
Mining Co. v. Bukvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P.2d 316 (1939).
195. "[llf they commit an error of judgment through mere recklessness, or want of
ordinary prudence and skill, the corporation may hold them responsible for the conse-
quences." Wangrow v. Wangrow, 211 App. Div. 552, 556, 207 N.Y.S. 132, 136 (1924).
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anyone in the corporation to refrain from intentional torts. On the
other hand, if the .corporation must bear the impact of punitive damages
without insurance where no cause of action against the employee exists,
then at least there would be internal political pressures-from share-
holders, directors, and other officers-to avoid the commission of inten-
tional torts.196 In addition, where the corporate managers under the
protection of the business judgment rule are assessed punitive damages,
they can, under many corporate statutes, 197 seek indemnification from
the board of directors, under a theory that such losses were incurred
in the interest of the corporation and should be borne by it.' 98  Cer-
tainly when a corporation has so indemnified a director, it has, as an
entity, ratified the tortious act and should thus be considered, in a man-
ner of speaking, institutionally guilty of wrongdoing. But even where
an indemnification is not actually made, the ability of a corporation to
indemnify is itself evidence that the tortious act is attributable to the cor-
poration in a way that a nonmanagerial tort is not. In short, a
managerial tort attempted for the benefit of the corporation needs to
be deterred. Insurance covering resultant punitive damages-when
imposed directly upon the corporation or even when liability is volun-
tarily assumed under the indemnification statutes-should be against
public policy.
Third, assume that the corporate managers described above acted
negligently or in their own interests, and hence did not come under
the aegis of the business judgment rule. Since these managers have
violated a duty of care or loyalty to the corporation, the corporation
could bring an action against these managers to recover all losses proxi-
mately caused. Thus, an insurance company in sibrogation could
establish its cause of action, and insurance for punitive damages should
be allowed. Under these facts, it could be said that the corporation
has been victimized by the very persons, the managers, upon whom the
shareholders place the most trust. Civil liability and punitive damages
imposed on the corporation here were not incurred in pursuit of cor-
196. One great incentive to avoid incurring civil liability is the fact that such losses
must often be entered on the corporate balance sheets as special items of loss. Such a
special balance sheet entry might cause directors and shareholders to take a special note
of the managers' wrongful activity. But if in the same breath corporate managers could
boast that the loss because of punitive damages was largely offset by insurance, much of
the beneficial outrage from shareholders and directors would be lost.
197. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(i) (West Supp. 1976) (effective Jan. 1,
1977); DEL. CODE ANw. tit. 8, § 145 (1974); ABA MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT ANN. 2D §
5, 1 (1971 & Supp. 1974).
198. For further discussion, see notes 203-06 & accompanying text infra.
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porate benefit. Rather they are the product of cynical self-dealing or
gross negligence. This is not a situation in which these managers could
receive indemnification from the corporation for their personal liability
for civil damages and punitive damages. The statutes expressly condi-
tion indemnification on good faith and due care on the part of the cor-
porate managers.1 99 Insurance coverage for punitive damages has an
additional benefit in such a situation. Corporate officers who cause the
corporation to incur punitive damages, and who are not protected from
liability to the corporation by the business judgment rule may still retain
sufficient political power within the corporation to prevent the board of
directors from instituting suit against them for breach of their duty of
loyalty or care. Thus, absent a shareholder derivative suit, ultimate
liability for punitive damages may never be visited upon the corporate
agents who are ultimately at fault. On the other hand, an insurance
company with subrogation rights would have an important financial
incentive to pursue these guilty individuals. Thus, insurance coverage
of punitive damages where the business judgment rule does not protect
corporate managers may actually increase corporate accountability for
intentional torts.
This rule seeks to achieve a balance between two competing inter-
ests. Corporations and especially corporate managers should be sub-
ject to some form of deterrence to implement the social objective of
preventing tortious acts, while innocent shareholders should be allowed
some measure of protection against financial liability for which their
corporation is only vicariously responsible. It is further submitted that
in operation such a rule would have the effect of placing corporations
on a parity with other business enterprises currently allowed to protect
themselves from nonpersonal liability.
California Corporations
It should be noted that in California the above proposed rule of
insurance coverage would have limited applicability. California's statu-
tory policies against imposing purely vicarious punitive damages and
against insurance for intentional acts largely precludes any judicial dis-
cretion to allow insurance for punitive damages.2 00 A potential appli-
199. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977),
which requires that the agent "acted in good faith, in a manner ... believed to be in the
best interests of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an
ordinarily prudent person in like position would use under similar circumstances."
200. See notes 86-91 & accompanying text supra.
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cation of this policy, however, may loom in California's new corpora-
tions code.
Under the new code, as under its predecessor, 0 1 the corporation
will be authorized both to indemnify its agents for various liabilities
20 2
and to purchase insurance to cover amounts paid to corporate agents
in indemnification.203  The new code also authorizes corporations to
purchase insurance for their agents to cover other liabilities.20 4 Indem-
nity and insurance for the directors and officers of the corporation is in-
tended to insulate these corporate agents from financial losses imposed
upon them for their actions on behalf of the corporation,20 5 and nothing
in these indemnification statutes seems to preclude coverage of punitive
damages for which the officer or director has been held liable.
2 06
201. CAL. CoRp. CoDE § 830 (West 1955).
202. Id. § 317(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1976) (eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
203. Id. § 317(b)(i).
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 191; Greenberg & Dean, Protecting the Corporate
Executive: Director and Officer Liability Insurance Reevaluated, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 555
(1975); A Forum, Insurance Against Liabilities of Directors and Officers, 22 Rnc. Ass'N
B.N.Y. 342 (1967); Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 648 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Executives]; Note, Indemnification of
the Corporate Insider: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 54 MINN. L. REv.
667 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Indemnification].
206. In a proceeding "other than an action by or in the right of the corporation,"
the agent can be indemnified by the corporation for fines and judgments. CAL. CoRP.
CODE § 317(b) (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. § 145(a) (1975). Certain types of
actions falling within the scope of indemnification may entail a punitive award. Exam-
ples are libel and slander, although defamation is usually excluded under the terms of the
policy. Additionally, a director could be made a defendant in an antitrust action
involving treble damages. See A Forum, Insurance Against Liabilities of Directors and
Officers, 22 REc. Ass'N B.N.Y. 342, 353 (1967). Allowing such insurance would seem
to raise a question in California under section 533 of the Insurance Code and section
1668 of the Civil Code if the action was intentional, but treble damages at least can be
awarded without a showing of intentional wrongdoing, thus eliminating the question of
public policy. Assuming the corporation has indemnified its agent for punitive damages,
whether the corporation's own indemnification reimbursement insurance covers this will
depend initially on the terms of the policy. Currently, several companies offer this type
of insurance, but most policies are modeled on that of Lloyd's of London, the prototype.
Both reimbursement and officer-director insurance are included in one policy. Usually
the corporation pays 90% of the premium, and the insured executive is responsible for
the remaining 10%. The policy typically has a deductible of at least $20,000, and a
coinsurance clause requiring the insured officer to contribute 5% of the loss sustained.
The Lloyd's policy covers an area said to be virtually coextensive with the permissible
range of indemnification under statute. See Corporate Executives, supra note 205.
Loss is defined as "any amount an [insider] is obligated to pay in respect of his
legal liability, whether actual or asserted, for a wrongful act. . . and . . . shall include
However, under the rule proposed in this note, a corporation should
not be able to obtain a reimbursement for these amounts from an insur-
ance company. As stated earlier,20 7 corporate indemnification of an
agent for his liability resulting from an intentional tort verges upon cor-
porate ratification of the act. In California, such an indemnification
is purely voluntary on the part of the corporation." 8 Also, indemnifi-
cation presupposes that the corporate officer breached no duty to the
corporation,- in which case no subrogation action would be available
to the insurance company. Thus, insurance to cover indemnification
for punitive damages should be considered in violation of public policy.
Finally, with respect to insurance that corporations can buy on
behalf of its agents, it seems clear that California law will not permit
coverage for liability resulting from intentional acts.210 Moreover,
insurance coverage for punitive damages in such a case should be held
in violation of public policy under the reasoning of the McNulty case.
damages, judgments, settlements, and expenses incurred in the defense of actions, suits,
or proceedings and appeals therefrom; provided always that such subject of loss shall not
include fines or penalties imposed by law, or other matters which may be deemed
uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this policy shall be construed." Indemnifi-
cation, supra note 205, at 686. Insurance policies are construed strictly against the
drafter; punitive or treble damages may be legitimately subject to the interpretation that
such are imposed by law. See id. However, the second clause, excluding matters
uninsurable under law, should be taken to exclude only those fines which are uninsurable
in a particular jurisdiction. Thus, for example, both in Tennessee, which allows
insurance for punitive damages in general, and in New Jersey, which follows a policy of
noncoverage but has established an exception for vicarious liability, such an award
should be covered by the reimbursement policy. Insurability of treble damages would
depend on the purpose such damages are intended to serve. It has been argued that such
damages are intended to compensate for various uncalculated damages, that they are
punitory in impact, and that their dominant purpose is to encourage injured parties to
bring suit, an objective which promotes compensatory and punitive aspects. Commis-
sioner v. Obear-Nestor Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 982 (1955) (punitory impact); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
521, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (encouraging suits); Vold, Are Three-fold Damages Under
the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory? 28 Ky. LJ. 117 (1940) (compensation for
uncalculated damages). One policy on the market, the American Home Policy, specifi-
cally excludes such damages. See Bishop, supra note 191, at 109 n.66. For further
discussion of this subject, see id.; Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends
in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968);
Brook, Directors' Indemnification and Liability Insurance, 21 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1975);
Corporate Executives, supra note 205; Indemnification, supra note 205.
207. See notes 197-98 & accompanying text supra.
208. "[A] corporation shall have power to indemnify . . . ." CAL. CoRP. CODE §
317(b), (c), (i) (West Supp. 1976).
209. See note 199 supra.
210. See note 91 & accompanying text supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
November 19761 INSURANCE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 475
Conclusion
It has been shown that American jurisdictions are split on the
question of whether a person should be allowed to insure himself
against punitive damages. This note has argued that the better position
views such insurance as contrary to public policy, which demands that
the guilty parties not be able to shift their penalties to insurance com-
panies. States taking this latter view would, however, make an excep-
tion for the case in which punitive damages are imputed through
respondeat superior to the otherwise blameless employer. Corporate
employers pose special complexities in regard to this exception, and in
order to aid in determining instances of institutional guilt, this note has
proposed a rule to distinguish between insurable and noninsurable
punitive damage judgments assessed against corporations.
A special interest has been taken in California, where case law
on the issue of insuring against punitive damages is sparse. It has been
observed that the problems faced by other states on this matter are
largely absent in California. Statutory law purports to limit punitive
damages to cases involving intentional torts and generally forbids any
insurance coverage at all for intentional torts. In the rare case in which
the issue of insurability of punitive damages might arise in California,
it has been argued that analogous authorities would lead the courts of
this state to find that such insurance would violate public policy. For
the courts of this or any other state to hold to the contrary would tend
to eviscerate the punitive effect that the doctrine of punitive damages
was designed to achieve.
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